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ABSTRACT 
 
During the first four decades of the 20th century, a system of ideas about the evolution and 
systematics of humans and other primates coalesced around the work of George Gaylord 
Simpson and W. E. Le Gros Clark.  Buttressed by the "new physical anthropology" of the 
1950s, that system provided an authoritative model — a disciplinary matrix or paradigm — for 
the practice of that aspect of biological anthropology.  The Simpson-Le Gros Clark synthesis 
began to unravel in the 1960s and collapsed in the 1970s under the onslaught of cladistic 
systematics.  The cladistic "revolution" resembles a paradigm shift of the sort proposed by 
Thomas Kuhn because it was driven, not by new biological discoveries or theories, but by a 
change in aesthetics. 
 
 
 
 
  
  
 People have been writing about revolutions in science at least since the 1700s, and 
talking about the Scientific Revolution (of the 1600s) for over a hundred years.  When most 
people talk about a revolution in some science, the associated picture is one of a leap forward, 
leading to progress in human knowledge and a better understanding of the world.  But what 
that phrase chiefly conjures up in the minds of historians of science is the work of their fellow 
historian Thomas Kuhn, who pictured scientific revolutions in a different light. 
 
 In his 1962 book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn proposed that a mature 
science cycles back and forth through two phases.  In the ground state, which he called "normal 
science," the science's practitioners are agreed on what counts as a problem and how one 
should go about solving it.  Their agreement — the system of shared assumptions that unites a 
group of researchers into a community — constitutes what Kuhn variously called a 
"disciplinary matrix" or a "paradigm."  The latter term has stuck and become a vague synonym 
for "norm" in common parlance, so that journalists now write stories about paradigm shifts in 
home financing or ice cream.   
 
 In Kuhn's model, scientists working during the normal-science phase try to "articulate" 
a paradigm by making and testing predictions based on its assumptions, and trying to cover any 
failed predictions by tweaking the paradigm or the observations a bit.  When the anomalies 
become sufficiently large, numerous, intractable, and annoying, somebody rethinks the subject 
from its foundations upward and comes up with a new paradigm with different concepts and 
assumptions, in which the former anomalies become predictable and understandable.  The 
science then enters an excited "revolutionary" state, in which the proponents of the old and new 
paradigm argue past each other from different premises.  Once all the defenders of the old 
paradigm are converted or dead, the community regroups around the new paradigm and a new 
period of normal science commences its reign. 
 
 Kuhn's picture is far more subtle and fine-grained than the preceding sketch, and it has 
a lot to recommend it.  It has played a big role in subsequent discussions of the history of 
science.  There are problems with it — for one thing, the distinction between normal and 
revolutionary science, between paradigm tweaking and paradigm replacement, is vaguer and 
more gradated than Kuhn made out — but everyone would agree that there have been 
"revolutionary" periods in the histories of some sciences that resemble Kuhn's paradigm-shift 
model.  What made Kuhn's account intriguing and controversial was his insistence that a 
decision to drop an old paradigm and adopt a new one represents a leap of subjective faith, 
akin to the new light that dawns in the mind of a religious convert — "a conversion experience 
that cannot be forced" by objective evidence or rational arguments (Kuhn, 1970, p. 151).  
Because a paradigm shift transforms the standards by which theories are judged, "paradigm 
change cannot be justified by proof" and is driven to a large extent by "subjective and aesthetic 
considerations" (ibid., p. 156).  Kuhn concluded that in future it might be necessary to give up 
altogether on the Whiggish notion that scientific revolutions "carry scientists and those who 
learn from them closer and closer to the truth" (ibid., p. 170). 
 
 Most practicing scientists would, I think, brush this last claim aside.  Although we all 
grudgingly acknowledge that parts of our current pet theories are probably going to turn out to 
be wrong in the long run, we feel that we can say with something like perfect confidence that a 
lot of previous theories and theoretical entities (phlogiston, caloric, four-element chemistry, 
Lemuria, etc.) are now permanently off the table.  Most of us also expect that when we do 
decide to chuck some current theory, it will be because evidence and arguments have 
compelled us, however reluctantly, to give it up — provided, that is, that some better 
alternative is available to take the place of the rejected "paradigm."  (The politicians' maxim 
that "You can't beat something with nothing" applies equally in science.)   Scientists of my age, 
born before 1950, had an opportunity to witness this process in action on a grand scale during 
the 1960s in the plate-tectonics revolution in geology, which was unarguably driven by new, 
unexpected empirical findings. Many of us have experienced the process more painfully on a 
smaller scale by seeing our own ideas refuted by such findings.  Running that risk is part of 
being a scientist.  The notion that such evidence can never compel the rejection of a theory 
seems contrary to both experience and common sense; and giving up on the idea that the 
practice of science brings us closer to the truth would for most of us render the whole scientific 
enterprise pointless. 
 
 But biological anthropologists of my age have also witnessed at least one scientific 
"revolution" that seems to conform to Kuhn's model — namely, the triumph of cladistic 
systematics in biology during the 1970s.  In the late 1960s, when I first began working in the 
mammal collections of the world's great natural history museums, most of them were 
organized according to the classification of George Gaylord Simpson (1945), which included a 
mix of polyphyletic, paraphyletic, and monophyletic taxa.  Today, fifty years later, most of 
those collections have been regrouped into strictly cladistic categories, following the 
classification of McKenna and Bell (1997) or one of its alternatives or modifications.  This 
change represents a significant shift in specimens in museum cabinets, and arguably in 
Kuhnian paradigms.  And just as Kuhn's account would have predicted, it was not forced on 
scientists by any new empirical findings during the 1960s and '70s; it was brought about by 
something much more like a religious conversion experience.   
 
 In what follows, I will tell the story of this Kuhnian revolution as it looked from the 
standpoint of one physical anthropologist of the 20th century.  I am going to argue that its 
conformity to Kuhn's model was imperfect, and that the reason it conformed to that model to 
some extent was that it was not a scientific event.   
 
THE OLD PARADIGM AND ITS ORIGINS 
 
 When I entered graduate school in 1964, evolutionary anthropology was dominated by 
the systematics of G. G. Simpson, the evolutionary narrative of W. E. Le Gros Clark, and the 
bias towards taxonomic lumping that was part of the "new physical anthropology."  These three 
items were all grounded in taxonomic theory.  They complemented and reinforced each other, 
combining to wield an authoritative clout that dictated the standards and procedures of "normal 
science" in the study of primate and human evolution.  But although these three things added 
up to what Kuhn might have recognized as a paradigm, they had achieved their predominance 
not through a Kuhnian revolution, but through a gradual accretion of small changes in 
mammalian systematics and evolutionary theory. 
 
 The accretion of the Simpson-Le Gros Clark "paradigm" goes back to the early 20th 
century, around the time of the founding of the American Journal of Physical Anthropology.   
The process began with a cascade of changes in the taxonomic status of the tree shrews 
(Tupaiidae).  Most nineteenth-century systematists had assigned the tupaiids to the order 
Insectivora, a paraphyletic grab-bag of mainly small, nocturnal, unspecialized, insectivorous 
eutherian mammals: shrews, moles, chrysochlorids, hedgehogs, solenodontids, tenrecs, 
elephant shrews, and tree shrews (and sometimes colugos), plus a flock of similar and related 
fossil forms.  Elephant shrews and tree shrews differed from typical Insectivora in having 
bigger eyes, a bony auditory bulla, an intestinal cecum, and generally diurnal habits.  Some 
systematists followed Ernst Haeckel in grouping them into an order of their own, the 
Menotyphla.   
 
 Noting certain lemur-like features in tupaiid skulls, hands, and feet, the American 
paleontologist W. K. Gregory proposed in 1910 that primates might have evolved from "large-
brained arboreal Insectivores resembling in many ways" the tree shrews Tupaia and 
Ptilocercus.  In 1922, the Swedish anatomist Albertina Carlsson went a step further.  Tallying 
up a host of resemblances between tree shrews and the lemurs of Madagascar — including the 
"intrabullar" tympanic ring, the postorbital bar, the comb-like lower front teeth (and the 
correlated presence of a brush-like sublingua), and certain features of the hands and feet — 
Carlsson concluded that "the Tupaiidae should not be counted among the Insectivora, but ought 
to constitute a special suborder of the Prosimiae." 
 
 Carlsson's publication was read with interest by the English anatomist W. E. Le Gros 
Clark, who had just returned to England from a posting as a medical officer in Borneo, where 
he had studied tree shrews.  His initial reports on Tupaia and Ptilocercus (Le Gros Clark, 
1924a, b, 1926) went little beyond Gregory's conclusion that Tupaia represents a 
"morphologically annectant form between the true insectivores and the lemuroids."  Le Gros 
Clark suggested that "Ptilocercus and Tupuia represent two successive phases in the 
evolutionary development of a lemurid from a primitive, insectivorous, eutherian mammal" 
(Le Gros Clark, 1926).  But in the context of the grade-based systematic practice of the time, 
this did not necessitate assigning them to the Primates; and Le Gros Clark at first stopped short 
of doing so.   
 
 Two publications by the young American paleontologist G. G. Simpson appear to have 
transformed Le Gros Clark's thinking about primates.  The first was Simpson's landmark 1928 
study of Mesozoic mammals, in which he concluded that the crucial anatomical markers of 
mammalian status (temporomandibular joint, three middle-ear ossicles, etc.) had evolved 
separately in four different lineages of Mesozoic synapsids.  However, Simpson declined to 
split Mammalia into four different orders on that basis, because the ancestral stocks of the four 
line-crossing lineages were closely related, and the parallel changes had presumably been 
driven by identical selection pressures in all four.  He accordingly accepted Mammalia as a 
coherent but polyphyletic grouping, adopting the principle that a taxon can be defined by 
parallel trends in closely related lineages (Cartmill, 2012).  As Simpson put it thirty years later, 
"In practice it is a sufficient principle for evolutionary taxonomy that each taxon arose wholly 
from one of lower categorical level, as Class Mammalia from Order Therapsida" (Simpson, 
1959). 
 
 The second work of Simpson's that had a big impact on Le Gros Clark was Simpson's 
1931 study of the skeleton of the Oligocene mammal Anagale.  This creature's skull, with its 
big orbits, long snout, and inflated bulla (Fig. 1), looks something like that of Tupaia, although 
Anagale shares no significant apomorphies with tree shrews and is now generally thought to be 
a distant relative of rodents and rabbits (McKenna, 1963; Van Valen, 1964).  Simpson, 
however, convinced himself that Anagale probably had an "intrabullar" tympanic ring, like 
lemurs and tree shrews, and resembled lemurs more closely than living tupaiids in its cheek 
teeth and in having flattened nails rather than claws on its hind feet.  He assigned it to a 
superfamily Tupaioidea within the Menotyphla, but argued that "the existence in Anagale of all 
of the lemur-like characters of the tupaioids" (apart from a few "rather trivial" features like the 
postorbital bar) strengthened the case for the tree shrews' primate affinities. 
 
 In his 1934 book The Early Forerunners of Man, Le Gros Clark cited Simpson's work 
in arguing the following propositions: 
 
(a) Tree shrews are lemuroid primates, more closely related to the 
lemurs of Madagascar than to the lorises. 
 
(b) Anagale is a primitive tree shrew, and therefore is also a lemuroid 
primate, more closely related to lemurs than to lorises. 
 
(c) Therefore, the distinctive modern-primate traits that are absent in 
living tree shrews (e.g., flattened nails), or in Anagale (the postorbital 
bar), or in both (e.g., grasping hind feet) must have evolved separately 
in lemurs and lorises. 
 
(d) Therefore, those traits must also have evolved separately in 
anthropoids, and probably also in tarsiers. 
 
 From all this, it follows that the primates are united, not by the shared inheritance of 
any particular anatomical features, but by a shared tendency to evolve in a monkey-like 
direction.  The distinctive apomorphies shared by living lemurs, lorises, tarsiers, and 
anthropoids — flattened nails, grasping feet, enlarged brains, keen, forward-facing eyes 
mounted in bony rings, and so on — have evolved repeatedly in multiple parallel lines of 
descent from an ancestral primate that lacked these features.  Shared trends, not shared traits, 
thus defined the order Primates for Le Gros Clark, just as they defined the class Mammalia in 
Simpson's view.  Accepting Le Gros Clark's analysis, Simpson transferred the Tupaioidea 
(including Anagale) to the lemur infraorder Lemuriformes (excluding the lorises and galagos) 
in a 1935 paper written in consultation with Le Gros Clark, and he retained that arrangement in 
his canonical 1945 classification of the mammals (Simpson, 1945, pp. 61-62). 
 
 In his 1934 book, Le Gros Clark had attributed the primate evolutionary trends to 
hereditary tendencies inherent in the primate genome, with a nod toward the orthogenetic 
evolutionary theories preached by Henry Fairfield Osborn.  Evolution, he wrote, 
 
...is the manifestation of an inherent tendency in the germ-plasm to vary 
along definite and limited lines; the modification of an organism is not 
due to the natural selection of apparently fortuitous variations which 
may occur in any direction, but rather to a process of continuous change 
which is taking place in the germ-plasm itself.  (1934, p. 287) 
 
 But as the "new evolutionary synthesis" solidified during the 1930s and '40s, Simpson 
and its other architects thrust orthogenesis and other non-Darwinian forces and processes out of 
the theoretical picture.  Swimming with the intellectual current, Le Gros Clark dropped Osborn 
and orthogenesis from The Antecedents of Man, the 1959 expansion of his 1934 book, and 
from his shorter introductory text History of the Primates  (Le Gros Clark, 1956).  In those 
books, he deferred to the new consensus and attributed the primate evolutionary trends to 
natural selection, as "a natural consequence of an arboreal habitat" that had favored the 
evolution of grasping feet, flattened nails, vertical postures, big eyes, big brains, and reduced 
noses (Le Gros Clark, 1959, pp. 43, 126, 174, 228).  This narrative account, and the 
Simpsonian model of systematics that went with it, were accepted as textbook verities during 
my years in college and graduate school, and Le Gros Clark's books were universally regarded 
as authoritative.  
 
 The third major component of the old taxonomic paradigm was a distinct preference for 
lumping over splitting.  This too had its roots in the neo-Darwinian synthesis, which placed 
powerful theoretical stress on the importance of variation within populations.  Both Occam's 
Razor and neo-Darwinian theory therefore promoted seeing differences between specimens as 
examples of that variation whenever possible.  The old habit of using taxonomic labels to flag 
almost any sort of morphological differences between two fossil hominins or other primates, 
which had led to a riotous multiplication of species and genera of ancient humans, was 
condemned as "typological" thinking, and it was regarded as scientific and virtuous to make 
one genus or species grow where two, three, or a dozen had previously flourished. 
 
 Neo-Darwinism famously burst upon biological anthropology in 1950 at the fifteenth 
Cold Spring Harbor Symposium, convened around the topic "Origin and Evolution of Man."  
This meeting brought young and old physical anthropologists together with population 
geneticists and such important contributors to the new synthesis as Simpson, Theodosius 
Dobzhansky, and Ernst Mayr.  This symposium and its sequelae represent as close an approach 
to a confrontation between defenders of competing paradigms as can be found in the history of 
biological anthropology, and the confrontation is sometimes described in Kuhnian terms 
(Tuttle, in press).  The 39-year-old leader of the new-paradigm party, Earnest Hooton's student 
Sherwood Washburn, laid down a manifesto, subsequently articulated in several influential 
publications (Washburn, 1951a, b, 1953), proclaiming that classification considered in the 
abstract, without regard to the adaptive meaning of the traits involved, is vacuous, typological, 
and unbiological.  "If one is interested in the mechanics of evolution, in the understanding of 
process," wrote Washburn (1951a), "a cumbersome and constantly changing classification is a 
great liability and the tendency will be to lump, to leave fragmentary bits unnamed, and to 
create new groups only when absolutely necessary." 
 
 At the 1950 symposium, perhaps the most radical expression of this preference for 
lumping was Mayr's reclassification of the fossil hominids (as hominins were then called).  
Asserting that the total range of morphological variation within the entire order Primates was 
no greater than that seen within the fruit-fly genus Drosophila, Mayr proposed to reduce the 
clutter of named hominid genera — Homo, Australopithecus, Plesianthropus, Paranthropus, 
Eoanthropus, Meganthropus, Pithecanthropus, Sinanthropus, and so on — to a single genus, 
with three species: Homo transvaalensis (all the australopithecines), H. sapiens (including 
Neandertals), and H. erectus for all the creatures in between.  Homo transvaalensis never 
caught on, but Mayr's concept of H. erectus has proved more durable.  Following Mayr's 
example, the paleontologists Elwyn Simons and David Pilbeam (1965) carried out a similar 
massacre of Miocene ape taxa, collapsing a bewildering array of 53 named species attributed to 
two dozen genera into just three genera — Ramapithecus, Gigantopithecus, and Dryopithecus 
— containing only 9 species.  For me and other students who were struggling to learn our fossil 
primates in the late 1960s, this new "scientific" classification came as a huge relief. 
 
 The rhetoric surrounding these taxonomic moves was one of uncompromising, hard-
nosed scientism.  A favorite rhetorical device, which has tended to recur throughout the history 
of our discipline, was to berate physical anthropologists for not keeping up with the truly 
scientific ideas and norms prevailing in other areas of biology.  "Those interested in human 
evolution," declared Washburn (1951), "must borrow their general theories and principles from 
others who have access to wider data and more manageable subjects. The task of the 
anthropologist is to fit knowledge of the primates into the framework of modern evolutionary 
theory, as described by numerous authors in Genetics, Paleontology, and Evolution (Jepsen, 
Simpson, Mayr, 1949) and as developed in The Meaning of Evolution (Simpson, 1949)."  
"Vertebrate taxonomists are, of course, well accustomed to taking account of groups of 
characters in their assessment of the zoological status of an animal," wrote Le Gros Clark 
(1955, p. 181), "and they are quite conversant with the phrase ‘character complex’. But 
anthropologists and human anatomists (perhaps from lack of experience in the practice and 
principles of taxonomy) often tend to focus their attention rather on single characters in their 
discussion of relationships.”  These condescending sentences were quoted approvingly by 
Simons and Pilbeam (1965).  With equal condescension, Mayr (1951) chided Franz 
Weidenreich for his "inability to understand" mosaic evolution — a defect manifested in 
Weidenreich's stubborn contention that the jaw and braincase of Piltdown Man belonged to 
different species. "It is obvious," wrote Mayr, "that one type does not change into another type 
evenly and harmoniously, but that some features run way ahead of the others. The inability to 
understand this has been the reason for Weidenreich's insistence that Eoanthropus was an 
artifact."    
 
PRELUDE TO A SORT OF REVOLUTION 
 
 If the advent of the "New Physical Anthropology" was a Kuhnian paradigm shift, the 
period of "normal science" that followed was remarkably short.  Le Gros Clark's books of the 
1950s (1955, 1956, 1959) had barely ascended to the seat of canonical authority before the 
taxonomic foundations of the whole "classical primatological synthesis" (Cartmill, 1982a) 
began to shift and disintegrate. 
 
 The upheaval began, innocuously enough, with some new terminology.  The innovator 
was Julian Huxley, a contributor to the neo-Darwinian synthesis and a fertile coiner of new 
ideas and terms, who had invented the concept of a "cline" to discourage the naming of 
subspecific taxa (Huxley, 1938) and made the New Evolutionary Synthesis a thing by giving it 
that label (Huxley, 1942).  In a brief note published in Nature in 1957, Huxley borrowed the 
then-novel term and concept of "cladogenesis" from the German biologist Bernhard Rensch 
(1954) and contrasted it with a term of his own devising, "anagenesis," to contrast two different 
ways in which new species can come into being.  Huxley then introduced the terms "clade" and 
"grade," to distinguish the species and higher taxa produced in these two ways. 
 
 Although "clade" was a new word, the underlying concept was not novel.  What we 
would now call clades were sometimes distinguished from other sorts of taxa by various labels 
(e.g., as "strictly monophyletic" or "natural" groups), and debates over the relative merits and 
practicality of "morphological" (horizontal or gradistic) versus "phylogenetic" (vertical or 
cladistic) classification were of long standing  (Weller, 1949; Wright, 1950; Simpson, 1951, 
1959).  But as is often the case, giving the clade concept a special label all its own made it 
easier and more convenient to think about it. 
 
 As systematists digested that concept and thought about it, the idea that all taxa should 
be clades soon raised its head.  A 1959 paper by Simpson reaffirming his polyphyletic 
conception of the class Mammalia was attacked straightaway by the American anthropologist 
Charles A. Reed (1960), who cited Julian Huxley in asserting that "a taxon should be a clade 
(whenever determinable) and not a grade."  Simpson's ex-student Leigh Van Valen (1960) 
seconded Reed in arguing that the mammal-like therapsid "reptiles" should be included in the 
mammals in order to make the class Mammalia monophyletic.   
 
 Attacks on the primate status of the tree shrews, a cornerstone of the Simpson-Le Gros 
Clark synthesis, followed shortly.  The paleontologist Malcolm McKenna (1963) reexamined 
the known fossils of Anagale and demolished Simpson's (1935) arguments for calling it a 
tupaioid. In 1965, Van Valen invoked cladistic principles in arguing that all the supposed 
resemblances between modern tupaiids and lemurs were either false homologies (e.g., the 
auditory bulla), primitive retentions (e.g., the palatine-lacrimal contact), or convergences.   
"Retention of primitive characters and independent acquisition of the remainder seem to me 
adequately to account for the total pattern of resemblance," wrote Van Valen. "It should be 
axiomatic that retention of the same primitive characters is of no use whatever in establishing 
vertical relationships. Only characters modified from the primitive condition in the same or 
different directions (preferably unusual directions) provide valid evidence one way or the 
other." Similar cladistic arguments and conclusions were advanced by R. D. Martin (1968), 
who introduced Remane's (1961) terms "synapomorphy" and "symplesiomorphy" for the first 
time into the literature of anthropological classification and used them systematically in 
analyzing previous claims about tupaiids. 
 
 Although Van Valen and Martin both relied on cladistic reasoning in reconstructing 
phylogeny, their systematic practices were not cladistic. They represented a sort of "purified 
Simpsonism" (Cartmill, 2012) that paved the way for the ascendancy of Hennigian 
phylogenetic systematics in the following decade.  The axioms of this intermediate approach 
were that all taxa should be monophyletic in the broad sense (meaning that the last common 
ancestor of all members of a taxon should also be included in that taxon) and that "The origin 
of the large majority of groups of organisms which can reasonably be called higher taxa is 
accompanied by an important change in their way of life" (Van Valen, 1971).  It was in the 
context of this still basically Simpsonian systematics that F. S. Szalay and I proposed 
conflicting definitions of the Primates, grounded in conflicting concepts of the adaptive shift 
that had generated the modern primates' synapomorphies (Szalay, 1968; Cartmill, 1972, 1974).  
None of us debating the boundaries of the order — Van Valen, Martin, Szalay, myself, or 
Robert Sussman and his colleagues later on (2013) — ever did so in the context of a 
consistently "phylogenetic" (vertical) systematics.  If we had, there would have been little to 
argue about beyond the furcation sequence of plesiadapiforms, euprimates, and Dermoptera 
(Kay et al., 1992; Bloch et al., 2007; Ni et al., 2013).  But arguments about taxon boundaries 
marked by adaptive shifts were swept away by the ascendancy of cladistics in the 1970s.  
 
THE REVOLUTION BEGINS 
 
 The Newton or Einstein of the new cladistic paradigm was the German entomologist 
Willi Hennig, who began in the 1950s to articulate a system of exclusively vertical 
classification (Hennig, 1950, 1968).  In Hennig's system, the delimitation of taxa was based 
exclusively on the sequence of phyletic divergence, so that what we now call the cladogram — 
the graph of sequential branchings — was read out directly as a Linnaean classification into 
nested sets (Fig. 2).   
 
 Hennig's method and principles stood in diametrical opposition to another would-be 
revolutionary systematics of the time, the "numerical taxonomy" or phenetic systematics 
developed and promoted by the microbiologist P. H. A. Sneath and the entomologist R. R. 
Sokal.  In their system, the species being classified are analyzed into a series of characters, 
each of which has two or more states in the total sample.  These character-state data are 
converted into numbers (e.g., 1's and zeroes for a two-state character), and computer-generated 
similarity coefficients are used to group the species data into nested sets — Linnaean taxa — 
that maximize the number of shared character states in each set.  Sneath and Sokal (1962) 
insisted that taxonomic relationships should be evaluated purely on the basis of the patterns of 
phenetic resemblance existing in the material at hand.  Speculation about phylogenetic 
relationships ought to play no role in classification.  If clustering on the basis of similarity 
yields polyphyletic groupings, this is a matter of indifference to the numerical taxonomist 
(Sneath and Sokal, 1962).  "A natural classification," wrote Sokal (1963), "is one whose 
constituent classes have many attributes in common and which is most useful for a wide range 
of purposes ... The recognition of natural groups as entities sharing the largest number of 
properties ... frees us from the other interpretation of natural groups as representing lines of 
common descent." 
 
 None of this had much immediate impact on anthropological systematics, nor did the 
work of Hennig and his earliest followers.  Biological anthropologists might still be operating 
on the Van Valen model today (as indeed a few of them are), had it not been for the dedicated 
efforts of two scientists: the anthropologist Morris Goodman and the ichthyologist Gareth 
Nelson.   
 
 Outside of biological anthropology, Nelson's contributions to the cladistic revolution 
are better known and understood than Goodman's, and his influence may have ultimately been 
decisive.  The philosopher-historian David Hull (1978) contends that "Not until Gareth Nelson 
took up the cause did Hennig's views begin to catch on among American systematists."  But 
Nelson's arguments for cladistics, which began to appear in Systematic Zoology in the early 
1970s (Nelson, 1971, 1972, 1973), were preceded by almost a decade by Goodman's.   
 
 Goodman's ideas about taxonomy emerged from his immunological studies on antisera 
to primate proteins, in which Pan, Gorilla, and Homo consistently clustered together to the 
exclusion of all other primates.  Asserting that "A major objective of post-Darwinian 
systematics is to create a truly evolutionary taxonomy in which organisms are grouped 
according to their propinquity of descent and their degree of genotypic similarity" (Goodman, 
1963a), Goodman cited Reed and Van Valen in dismissing Simpson's polyphyletic class 
Mammalia: 
 
It is generally recognized that grouping the Synapsida which contain the 
Therapsida with the Reptilia rather than Mammalia is an arbitrary 
convention ... used to express grade relationships. The acceptance of this 
convention by most systematists suggests that the pre-Darwinian 
concept of the scala naturae in which an animal series progresses from 
simple to morphologically complex organisms still operates in post-
Darwinian systematics. 
 
 Rejecting all criteria other than propinquity of descent, Goodman proposed to move 
chimpanzees and gorillas from the Pongidae over into the Hominidae: 
 
All these serological findings argue for a revision of the taxonomy of the 
Hominoidea since in the classifications now in use Gorilla and Pan are 
invariably placed with Pongo rather than Homo.  A broadening of the 
Hominidae to include Gorilla and Pan would reflect more closely the 
cladistic and genealogical relationships suggested by the serological 
data. (Goodman, 1963b) 
 
 This was a startling heresy in the context of the Simpson-Le Gros Clark "paradigm."  
Nevertheless, it was taken seriously as a debatable issue by the leading authorities.  
Responding to Goodman's ideas in their 1965 revision of the dryopithecines, Simons and 
Pilbeam deferred to Simpson as the authority in these matters: 
 
Pan, Gorilla, and Homo seem to be related more closely 
phylogenetically to each other than is Pongo. Whether the African apes 
are placed in the Hominidae or whether 3 groups of coordinate status 
should be retained would depend on whether greater emphasis is placed 
on the fact that the Hominidae have shifted to a new and distinct 
adaptive plateau, or on the close phyletic consanguinity between Homo 
and the African apes. This problem is clearly summarized by Simpson 
[1963, Fig. 5], and we agree with his conclusion that 2 families, 
Pongidac and Hominidae, are justified. 
 
 In the cited 1963 article — which was also written in response to Goodman — Simpson 
had concluded that "Both arrangements are equally consistent with our present understanding 
of hominid phylogeny, but the proposed new arrangement is less consistent with other 
evolutionary considerations, notably that of adaptive divergence."  But this was not a decisive 
rejoinder to Goodman, since the point at issue was precisely whether adaptive divergence 
should count for anything in classifications. 
 
 By the mid-1960s, then, biological anthropologists were familiar with both cladistic and 
Simpsonian "evolutionary" classifications of Hominidae and other primate taxa, and could 
choose between the two approaches.  As Simons and Pilbeam intimated, this was regarded 
essentially as a matter of taste, depending on whether one chose to place greater emphasis on 
adaptive modes or phyletic consanguinity.  None of this had much of a revolutionary flavor.  
Some additional rhetorical moves were required to elevate the discussion from aesthetics to the 
level of a Kuhnian confrontation between an old, unscientific paradigm and a new, scientific 
one. 
 
 The additional boost was provided by Nelson and his colleagues and converts at the 
American Museum of Natural History in New York, who began working assiduously in the 
early 1970s to present Hennigian cladism as the one true bearer of the standard of science in 
biological systematics.  One initial move was to rechristen cladism as "Darwin-Hennig 
classification" (Nelson, 1972), with reference to Darwin's suggestion in the Origin that 
"Propinquity of descent, the only known cause of the similarity of organic beings, is the bond ... 
which is partially revealed to us by our classifications" (Darwin, 1859, p. 414).  Another was to 
contrast the supposedly rigorous and objective cladistic system with the fuzzy and subjective 
"artistry" generally conceded to be involved in drawing grade boundaries between ancestor and 
descendant groups in Simpsonian systematics.  A third point urged in favor of cladism was that 
since it employs only a single criterion in classifying, it allows information about phylogeny to 
be recovered immediately from the classification, whereas no such recovery was possible with 
the mixed system of Simpson (Nelson, 1972).   
 
 Perhaps the most effective move was that made by Nelson's colleague E. O. Wiley 
(1975).  Wiley argued that a cladogram can be falsified (by showing that some other cladogram 
better fits the facts), whereas a Simpsonian "evolutionary" classification cannot.  Because it 
can be falsified, a cladogram (or its isomorphic Linnaean readout) qualifies as a scientific 
hypothesis by the demarcation criterion of the philosopher Karl Popper.  An "evolutionary" 
classification does not.  It follows that phylogenetic systematics alone deserves to be called 
scientific.  
 
 Other American Museum cladists, beginning with the arachnologist Norman Platnick 
(1978), soon followed Wiley in hailing cladograms as falsifiable hypotheses and in laying 
claim to the laurels of true Popperian science.  A complex and subtle debate ensued over a host 
of related philosophical questions.  Are non-universal (singular) statements falsifiable in 
Popper's sense? Are they even testable? Are taxa sets, or logical individuals?  If they are 
individuals, can they function as terms in falsifiable hypotheses? If we assign varying 
probabilities to different cladograms, does that count as a test of any of them?  Does Popper's 
philosophy withstand the numerous criticisms advanced by other philosophers?  These 
questions have largely subsided from the journals of biological systematics, but they continue 
to crop up in the writings of philosophers and historians of biology.  Interested readers can 
refer to the useful summaries and analyses of this literature by Hull (1978) and Vogt (2014). 
 
 Another move that added to the scientific luster of cladistics was its appropriation of 
the numerical taxonomists' methodology, which proved just as well adapted to evaluating taxa 
by counting shared synapomorphies as it had been to evaluating them by counting shared 
resemblances of all sorts.  Quantitative methods, and the debates that followed over the relative 
merits of different computer algorithms and criteria for assessing and comparing probabilities, 
enhanced the aura of methodological rigor and theoretical depth that surrounded the cladistic 
enterprise.  It should also be admitted that our ability to generate a classification by key-
punching a mass of character-state ones and zeroes and pressing a button lends the product an 
air of impersonal objectivity and authority, and alleviates the need for thinking about its details 
or assuming personal responsibility for its defects. 
 
 The final outcome of this confrontation between competing "paradigms" has been the 
almost complete triumph of phylogenetic systematics on the Hennigian model, with the 
addition of some further technical terms and a great expansion and refinement of the model's 
quantitative implementation.  The triumph was reflected in Sneath and Sokal's increasing 
insistence, from 1973 on, on the value of numerical methods for phylogenetic inference 
(Sneath and Sokal, 1973; Sokal, 1985; Sneath, 1995).  In biological anthropology today, 
vertical classification is the norm, and Goodman's classification is almost universally accepted 
(Fig. 2, C).  The specifically human clade (i.e., excluding Pan) within the hominoids is now 
almost always labeled as "hominin," and the word "hominid" tends to be avoided because there 
is little agreement on whether it includes gorillas or not.   
 
 One important side effect of the victory of cladistics has been the abandonment of the 
preference for taxonomic lumping that characterized the "new physical anthropology" of the 
1950s and '60s.  Because every furcation in a cladogram generates two sister taxa at some rank, 
the number of taxonomic ranks required for a complete Linnaean readout of a dichotomously-
branching cladogram for say, a genus containing 16 species will be between 5 and 16, 
depending on the topology of the cladogram (Fig. 3).  This awkward requirement can be 
addressed in four ways: (1) splitting the genus up into multiple genera, (2) naming taxa at all 
the available intermediate ranks (subgenus, infragenus, superspecies) plus inventing some new 
ones, (3) printing the cladogram but not completing the associated classification, and (4) giving 
up on the Linnaean hierarchy.  Option (4) has not caught on, and the solutions adopted in 
practice tend to be some combination of the other three.  This produces continual pressure for 
increased splitting of taxa above the species level. 
 A SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION? 
 
 In many ways, the shift from the systematics of Simpson and Van Valen to that of 
Hennig and his successors fits Kuhn's description of a scientific revolution or paradigm shift.  
The shift from one systematic paradigm to the other happened rather quickly in the decade 
between 1970 and 1980.  In the debates of the 1970s, advocates of the two schools did a great 
deal of talking past one another and hurling words like "absurd," "unbiological," and 
"arbitrary" at each other's heads, just as Kuhn's account would lead us to expect.  Adherents of 
the old systematics found it preposterous that anyone would group chimpanzees but not 
orangutans with humans, given that Pan and Homo are radically different in adaptation and 
share no anatomical synapomorphies.  And proponents of the new system found it 
incomprehensible that anyone would group turtles and Velociraptor together as "reptiles" to the 
exclusion of birds, given the close phyletic and anatomical affinities between birds and 
dinosaurs.  (I have at least twice heard young biologists say that prior to the 1970s, scientists 
did not realize that birds are closely related to dinosaurs.)   There really was a shift in people's 
ways of seeing the world, or at least the narrow aspect of it involved in issues of biological 
classification.   
 
 It also seems fair to say that the change met Kuhn's description in being "a conversion 
experience" that was not forced by new facts or objective evidence.  The facts are compatible 
with either system of classificatory practice.  Given a particular evolutionary tree (phylogram), 
one can with equal fidelity to the facts convert the phylogram into a cladogram and read that 
out directly as a phylogenetic classification (Fig. 2, C), or produce an evolutionary 
classification by drawing taxonomic boundaries on the phylogram as closed curves, positioned 
so that the branches of the tree cross those curves at points corresponding to major adaptive 
shifts (Fig. 2, B).  The two systems are different ways of using the same phylogeny in 
classification.  An evolutionary classification utilizes both phyletic and adaptive information, 
and there is an arbitrary or artistic element in deciding how to weigh and combine them; but 
neither system is more "scientific" than the other.  It is true that once one has arrived at a 
preferred cladogram, there is no artistry involved in converting it into a phylogenetic 
classification.  But arriving at that cladogram involves making artful and arbitrary decisions — 
e.g., concerning what is to going to count as a character, or concerning how characters are to be 
weighted.  (Automatic equal weighting of all characters is still arbitrary, and is in fact known in 
advance to be wrong.)  As Zachos and Hossfeld (2010) write:  
 
Any phylogenetic analysis has to be based on characters or, more 
exactly, on character states, and in order to be able to define character 
states one must have an idea of what a character is, or, in other words, 
one must have made a choice of which structures are considered to be 
comparable and which are not. No systematist would ever interpret 
the reduction of teeth and the reduction of limbs as two states of one 
character. Thus, a priori hypotheses (those about the definition of 
characters) are indispensable for the deductive concept of homology. 
 
 A priori assumptions, embodying the traditions of our discipline concerning what is to 
count as a character or as parsimony, are also involved in evaluating cladograms.  And once we 
have decided what we are going to count as characters, we are compelled to make other artistic 
judgments in deciding how to analyze those characters into character states.  It is possible to 
describe anatomical structures in different ways that are equally faithful to morphology but 
which result in different evaluations of cladograms (Cartmill, 1982b).  "The application of the 
parsimony principle," writes the philosopher R. A. Richards (2002), "is ultimately 
indeterminate because the choice and individuation of characters that figure in parsimony 
computations are indeterminate. The cladistic approach is Kuhnian because the application of 
parsimony depends on persuasion, background, training and tradition."  
 
 The claim that a phylogenetic classification is a scientific hypothesis in Popper's sense 
seems wrong.  A phylogenetic classification is directly inferred from a cladogram.  The 
cladogram is in turn deduced from a matrix of character states.  It is obvious that a character-
state matrix is not a hypothesis about anything.  Neither is its filtered form, the optimized 
cladogram.  A cladogram forbids nothing to happen, because biological theory gives us no 
grounds for expecting that the next character we look at will fit the pattern inferred from its 
predecessors, or that synapomorphies will ultimately outnumber or outweigh other sorts of 
resemblances in our data set.  As the German systematist Lars Vogt (2014) writes, "a given 
tree, in combination with descent with modification as background knowledge, does not 
prohibit any specific character-state distribution ... As a consequence ... cladograms are not 
falsifiable in principle and thus not testable in a Popperian sense." 
 
 The "scientific revolution" in biological (or at any rate zoological) systematics in the 
late 20th century thus does not appear to have been "scientific" in any sense that most scientists 
would acknowledge.  Was it a revolution in Thomas Kuhn's sense?   
 
 I think that it was.  To be sure, the fundamental assumptions underlying cladistic 
methods in reconstructing phylogeny were not novel in 1970, or even in 1950 when Hennig 
published his first book.  Throughout the 20th century, most biologists interested in systematics 
and classification vaguely understood and accepted the principle that only synapomorphies 
count in assessing phylogeny.  A hundred years ago, Chalmers Mitchell (1919) wrote that 
"Primitive characters may be useful for the definition or description of a group—they have no 
value for assigning degrees of affinity."  Throughout his 1928 monograph on Mesozoic 
mammals, G. G. Simpson evaluated various traits invoked in earlier reconstructions of 
synapsid phylogeny and rejected many of them as irrelevant because they were either 
symplesiomorphies —“primitive characters which give no evidence of special affinity” 
(Simpson, 1928, p. 167) — or convergences.  In urging the hominin status of the 
australopithecines, Le Gros Clark (1967, p. 23) insisted that the things that Australopithecus 
has in common with apes are only “characters of common inheritance” — what we call 
symplesiomorphies — and therefore of no use in determining relationships.  But the humanlike 
traits of the australopithecines were “characters of independent acquisition” — that is, 
synapomorphies — and they show that the australopithecines are stem-group hominids.  None 
of these principles were alien to the old, pre-cladistic paradigm in systematics. 
 
 But although the proponents of that older paradigm understood and used cladistic 
concepts and reasoning, they lacked words like "clade," "paraphyletic," and "synapomorphy."  
And words make a difference.  The vocabulary of cladistics, and the more precise ways of 
posing and thinking about questions of phylogeny that came in with it, sharpened the focus of 
discourse about phylogenetic reconstruction.  Earlier biologists understood and occasionally 
articulated the principles involved, but their thinking was muddled by nebulous talk of 
"affinities" and "annectant" forms — the verbal equivalent of the dotted lines and question 
marks that populate the evolutionary tree diagrams of pre-cladistic systematists.  The 
algorithmic methods of the numerical taxonomists, which cladistic systematists adapted and 
improved on for the construction and evaluation of alternative phylogenies, also represented a 
big methodological improvement over their precursors.  The science of systematics has 
benefitted significantly from all these innovations in the study of phylogenetic relationships. 
 
 However, phylogenetic relationships are not the same thing as taxonomy or 
classification.  (The proposition that they ought to be is of course the distinctive assumption of 
cladistic systematics.)  Most of the key concepts in the new vocabulary —  clade, grade, 
anagenesis, cladogenesis, synapomorphy, symplesiomorphy — were invented by evolutionary 
systematists between 1954 and 1961, before the advent of cladistics.  The foundations of the 
new quantitative methods were laid down during the same period by the numerical 
taxonomists.  I suspect that if Willi Hennig had never lived, and the version of evolutionary 
classification adopted in the 1960s by Van Valen and others had become the norm of 21st-
century systematic practice, our terminology and techniques of phylogenetic inference would 
look much the same as they look today.  We would generate and evaluate phylogenies in the 
same way, but our classifications would be different. 
 
 What, then, was the nature of the paradigm shift that led to the triumph of vertical 
classification in the closing decades of the last century?  To me, it seems clear that it did not 
involve any changes in biological theory.  Rather, it was a change in prevailing art styles, 
propelled by the sort of "subjective and aesthetic considerations" that Kuhn believed were the 
drivers behind all major changes in scientific thought.  Cladistics won out because systematists 
began to perceive it as ugly to, say, draw a horizontal boundary separating birds from other 
dinosaurs, overlooking their numerous synapomorphies and genetic affinities.  Conversely, 
their opponents thought it ugly to lump human beings and chimpanzees together in one 
subfamily to the exclusion of gorillas, ignoring their huge adaptive differences and poverty of 
synapomorphies.  Today's surviving representatives of that older school find it ugly to lump 
killer whales and sheep together in the same taxon to the exclusion of (say) horses or seals, 
because killer whales and sheep are not distinguished from horses and seals by any shared 
properties beyond the genetic synapomorphies that reveal their unique common ancestry.  But 
there is no disagreement between the two schools about the phylogenetic facts, or about the 
evolutionary theory that accounts for those facts.  The disagreement goes no deeper than a 
wrinkling of the nose.  It is a matter of taste. 
 
 Insofar as the Kuhnian "scientific revolution" in 20th-century systematics was 
scientific, then, it was not a revolution; and insofar as it was a revolution — a paradigm shift in 
Kuhn's sense — it was not scientific.  Admitting this does not amount to a criticism or a 
rejection of the new paradigm.  Both systems have their virtues and defects, and neither 
represents an improvement over the other in any scientific sense, any more than (say) Cubism 
represents a scientific advance over Impressionism.  But great Impressionist paintings can be 
beautiful in ways that Cubist paintings are not, and vice versa.  It may be possible in the 
century ahead to arrive at new styles in classification that will combine some of the beauties, 
and avoid some of the uglinesses, of both taxonomic approaches.  That outcome will depend on 
the creativity and artistry of future systematic theorists.  It will come about only when and if 
young scientists come to perceive current systematic practice as less than ideal, and set to work 
to do something about it. 
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FIGURE CAPTIONS 
 
Fig. 1.  Lateral view of the skull of the Oligocene eutherian Anagale.  (From Cartmill, 2012, 
after Simpson, 1931.  Used by permission of John Wiley & Sons.) 
 
Fig. 2.  Evolutionary vs. phylogenetic classification.  A: a simplified evolutionary tree 
diagram (phylogram) with a time axis (not to scale), showing how the human species Homo 
sapiens is genealogically and temporally related to some of its ancestors and collateral 
relatives.   B: an evolutionary classification draws taxonomic boundaries directly on the 
phylogram, producing grade boundaries between ancestral (primitive) and descendant 
(derived or specialized) groups.  The grade boundaries are positioned to coincide with major 
changes in adaptation — here, between arboreal apes (pongids) and terrestrial bipeds 
(hominids), and between Australopithecus and Homo.  The ancestral groupings below each 
grade boundary (Pongidae, Australopithecus) constitute paraphyletic or wastebasket taxa.  
Such groupings may include relatively primitive forms surviving later in time (e.g., Pan, 
Gorilla, and Pongo).  C: a phylogenetic (cladistic) classification has no time dimension.  All 
forms being classified are placed on the same line (gray band) and connected by a branching 
tree showing their phylogenetic relationships, with suspected ancestor-descendant pairs (e.g., 
Homo erectus and H. sapiens) represented either as conspecific (a single species) or as 
nearest relatives (sister groups).  The resulting atemporal tree diagram (the cladogram) is 
then read out as a Linnaean classification by translating the successive branchings into 
nested sets (brackets at top).  All taxa are clades, and there are no grade boundaries.  As a 
result, many taxa (e.g., Hominidae) have no distinctive adaptations or morphologies.  A 
complete phylogenetic classification of this part of the tree of life would include more 
species and more levels of branching, and would therefore use additional levels of the 
Linnaean hierarchy (super- and sub-genera and tribes, superspecies, etc.); see Fig. 3.  (From 
Cartmill, in press.  Used by permission of John Wiley & Sons.) 
 
Fig. 3.  The number of taxonomic ranks (r) needed for a complete transcription of a 
cladogram into a Linnaean classification depends on the number of terminal branches 
involved (n) and the topology of the cladogram.  In the diagrams above, n = 16 (black dots).  
When the cladogram is perfectly symmetrical at all levels and n is an integral power of 2, r is 
minimal (r = 1 + log2n: top diagram).  When the cladogram is "pectinate" — that is, 
uniformly right- or left-branching — r is maximized (r = n:  bottom diagram). 
